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The idea of exporting Singapore’s expertise in 
infrastructure development took hold, in the early 1990s, 
as part of a larger regionalization strategy. Singapore’s 
positive reputation with multinational corporations for 
the efficiency of its industrial infrastructure and its 
stable, corrupt-free investment environment underscored 
this strategy. Led by Singapore’s government-linked 
companies, industrial parks were established in several 
Asian countries. Their progress is a test of Singapore’s 
ability to export its efficiency in industrial park 
development and management outside its borders. This 
paper finds that the initial optimism with which the 





The development of overseas industrial parks is the main 
thrust of Singapore’s regionalization drive, which 
provides a key component of the strategy for 
strengthening the island's economy [14] [22] [23] [26]. 
Singapore's policymakers have great faith in the regional 
parks' success due to Singapore's connections to both 
multinational corporations (MNCs), established from the 
onset of the city-state's modern economic development, 
as well as guanxi, or connections, to Asian business 
networks [13] [33]. The inter-governmental projects 
were intended to result in privileged foreign investment 
zones but inadvertently exposed the parks to particular 
dependencies and challenges. These challenges have 
been accentuated by Asia's post-1997 economic crisis. 
 
To provide the context to this paper, a brief account of 
Singapore’s regionalization initiative is presented, 
followed by a stock-take of Singapore's industrial parks 
in Indonesia, China and Vietnam. The case study parks 
are then evaluated in terms of their progress in attracting 
investment, as well as their contribution to Singapore’s 
broader regionalization initiative. The concluding section 
considers the implications of these experiences for the 
future of Singapore’s regionalization program. 
 
REGIONALIZATION & THE SINGAPORE 
ECONOMY 
 
Since the mid-1960s, the Singapore government has been 
wooing foreign MNCs with incentives to fuel 
Singapore's economic development. By the mid-1980s, 
rising business costs meant that it was imperative for the 
country to shift from labor-intensive activities towards 
higher value-added ones to realise its vision of becoming 
a regional centre of advanced technology [16]. 
  
Singapore’s economic planners sought to expand the 
island's investment horizons through an overseas direct 
investment program launched in 1988. The program was 
geared towards accelerating access to new technology, or 
foreign markets, by supporting Singapore companies to 
form joint ventures with overseas companies in Europe 
and North America [4]. A significant proportion of 
investments are linked to the investments of Singapore’s 
GLCs. Most of these proved unsuccessful, resulting in 
enormous accumulated losses by the early 1990s [2] 
[12].  A new phase in the internationalisation strategy re-
focused on expansion within Asia. The change to 
regionalization was rationalised by the liberalisation of 
foreign investment controls occurring at the time in 
Asian countries, and the subsequent high growth rates 
these economies were achieving [8] [17] [19] [27] [30]. 
 
In 1993, the Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas 
(CPEO) was set up by the Government to examine 
further strategies for building an "external wing" to 
complement Singapore's domestic economy. Singapore 
companies were judged to have made little direct 
investment abroad on their own initiative compared to 
other East Asian countries [12]. This suggested that the 
Government had to take a lead in regionalization, or risk 
exclusion from growth opportunities as competitor 
countries were already moving to exploit in China and 
Southeast Asia [24]. CPEO's report endorsed these 
strategies, and recommended that the government 
cooperate with private investors by seconding experts, 
forming joint ventures and providing leadership in 
infrastructure projects [24]. The Government also 
initiated a series of platforms for strategic discussions 
and collaboration.  
 
Precise objectives for the regionalization program have 
not been made public, but it is clear that the starting 
ambition was large. It was announced, in 1994, that 
initially 2--3 percent of the republic's financial reserves 
would be directed to infrastructure projects in Asia, but 
could grow to 30--35 percent after 10-15 years [14]. The 
strategic intent is to facilitate Singapore’s transition to a 
‘total business centre’.  
 
THE INDONESIAN PARKS 
 
The parks on the Indonesian Riau islands of Batam and 
Bintan were the first of the government-linked projects 
to make significant progress. BIP was opened in 1992 
with Bintan Industrial Estate (BIE) opened in 1994. Both 
were envisaged as self-contained environments with their 
communication and business linkages through Singapore 
rather than through Indonesia. Self-containment in this 
context has resulted in an investment enclave offering 
facilities close to conditions in Singapore, in marked 
contrast to the outside environment.  
 
BIP and BIE are joint ventures between GLCs from 
Singapore and Indonesia. The Indonesian partner was the 
Salim Group, Indonesia’s largest business conglomerate, 
with close links to senior politicians [11]. Salim provided 
a guarantee of priority with respect to regulatory 
controls. The Singapore contributors took control of the 
design, physical development and management of the 
estate. This division of responsibilities allows Singapore 




Batamindo Industrial Park 
 
Batam had been the subject of possible joint Singapore-
Indonesia investment projects since Indonesia had started 
to promote Batam's economic development in the 1970s 
[3]. A mutual agreement was rendered in the late 1980s 
when Singapore's priority was additional production 
space and Indonesia was prepared to extend foreign 
investment concessions to kick start Batam's 
development [19] [29]. These included lifting of foreign 
ownership restrictions, the amendment of Batam’s duty 
free status to facilitate a proportion of outputs for export 
to the rest of Indonesia and allowance for foreign 
companies to manage industrial estates which provided 
Singapore GLCs with lowered investment risks leading 
to an opportunity for the joint venture to develop and 
manage BIP.  
 
Singapore’s vision of the role of Batam differed from the 
Indonesian ambition to create a diversified modern 
metropolis comparable to Singapore. Singapore’s 
economic planners envisaged Batam as a relocation point 
for low value assembly activity [15].  However, after 
Indonesia’s own efforts to promote Batam failed, there 
was a willingness to compromise development 
objectives, especially as BIP promised to lever other 
investment under the larger growth triangle initiative for 
which it became the key flagship project [18] [19] [31]. 
 
BIP was the first industrial estate to bring significant 
industrial activity to Batam. The first tenants arrived in 
1991, mainly branches of multinationals already 
operating in Singapore [30]. The provision of ready built 
factories for lease allowed quick occupation and minimal 
commitment. Also, the Singapore Economic 
Development Board (EDB) was active in encouraging 
leading MNCs in Singapore to use the Park. These 
companies perceived advantages in being supportive of 
government programs as taxation concessions are 
allocated on a case by case basis [20]. By June 2002, 
there were 88 companies and 66,000 workers in the Park 
(Table 1). The initial area reserved for the park (500 
hectares) has been fully committed. An industrial 
township has successfully been developed, but the 
limitations have arisen. 
 
In practice, the Park has become a Japanese electronics 
manufacturing enclave. Batam has filled a niche for the 
development of Japanese production networks in 
Southeast Asia [10]. This raises two issues: the 
vulnerability to a withdrawal of Japanese investments 
and the limited linkages to the Singapore economy. 
 BIP’s privileged access to senior politicians and policy-
makers has been diminished with the `apparent’ change 
of ownership in BIP (and BIE). The Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency has reportedly offered to sell the 
Salim Group’s stakes in all the Riau projects. BIP’s 
competitiveness has been eroded with the mushrooming 
of other industrial parks within close proximity. The 
competitor parks, backed by prominent Indonesian 
politicians, are rapidly developing to match BIP 
standards at competitive rentals, putting to question the 
premium placed on BIP. 
 
The Park’s reputation as an investment haven has not 
been left unscathed by political developments in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the September 11 
attacks and the Bali bomb blasts.  
 
Bintan Industrial Estate 
 
The willingness of Indonesian authorities to facilitate the 
BIE project was one of the positive spin-offs of BIP for 
Singapore. Singapore government agencies were able to 
secure a coastal site for the BIE project, and to reserve a 
4,000-hectare site to be developed over a decade or 
more.  
 
BIE's initial marketing targeted textiles, furniture and 
other wood processing activities. The attractiveness of 
the estate to garment manufacturers was enhanced by 
access to Singapore's export quota under the multi-fibre 
agreement. Access to this quota has since been lost, and 
a change in marketing emphasis was required as wood 
processing never took off. Electronics has been added to 
the marketing priorities. The project has been downsized 
to a 500-hectare development. As at June 2002, BIE has 
35 tenants and 13,000 workers. (Source: SembCorp 
Industries). 
 
The intention to develop a 500-hectare township appears 
unrealistic. The BIE project was ill-timed. BIE was 
launched at the same time as Singapore’s other flagship 
projects in China and Vietnam whose large emerging 
markets presented other lucrative options. BIE is thus 
faced with a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma as they require 
the economies of increased occupancy to improve the 
operating environment yet with the limited supporting 
environment it is difficult to attract tenants. For the 
present, BIE is neither a significant contributor to the 
restructuring of the Singapore economy, or a 
commercially viable project [21]. 
Land ownership has become a major contentious issue, 
as land acquired by the Salim Group has come under 
question by regional legislators and local farmers, 
leading to financial disputes with local villagers and mob 
protests. In February 2000, the Salim Group was 
prosecuted for alleged illegal land appropriation. 
Security at BIE has been heightened following the Bali 
bomb blasts. An inter-ministerial ceremony to mark the 
expansion of BIE was cancelled, and prospective tenants 
have postponed their site visits. While it is too early to 
assess the financial repercussions, BIE could do without 
the added uncertainties. 
 
THE CHINESE PARKS 
 
The Parks in China follow the physical design of BIP but 
the administrative context is different.  In Indonesia, the 
partner is a private company whereas in China, the 
Singapore investors work with government agencies. 
Another difference is the complexity of the 
administrative and regularity environment in China as 
compared to those in Indonesia. In Indonesia’s political 
system, the endorsement from senior national politicians 
has provided a degree of administrative certainty. In 
China, the projects has to contend with multiple tiers of 
government administration. The projects in China also 
had a political objective to demonstrate the 
transferability of Singapore’s `industrial development 
model’ to other Asian environments.  
 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP) 
 
CS-SIP is Singapore's most controversial overseas 
township project both in its total estimated project cost 
and land size. CS-SIP was conceived as a balanced 
community, home to a workforce of 360,000 and a total 
population of 600,000. It was to go beyond the prototype 
industrial park design (BIP) with full range of urban 
facilities. The ambition for CS-SIP reflected the goal of 
developing a township on a scale to test in China the 
effectiveness of the Singapore approach to social and 
economic development. This goal was encouraged by 
China’s former premier Deng Xiaoping who, it has been 
said, regarded Singapore as ‘a capitalist version of the 
communist dream’. Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew took up this message, and personally took 
charge of the formalisation of the idea into the 
development of CS-SIP [5].  
 
 The Singapore model, as applied to CS-SIP, 
encompasses methods for attracting and developing the 
commitment of foreign companies. Attributes thought to 
attain these conditions included quality infrastructure, 
strict pollution control, service reliability, ‘one stop’ non-
corrupt decision-making, minimum entry or performance 
regulation and transparent financial charges [25]. CS-SIP 
was developed by as a 65-35 joint-venture between 
consortia of Singapore-based and Chinese investors. The 
two consortia retain their separate identity and 
responsibilities. The project is overseen by the Suzhou 
Industrial Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC).  
 
Singapore’s optimism about the project was encouraged 
by a series of advantages secured at the outset of the 
project [28]. In practice, the significance of the inter-
governmental endorsement was reduced by the influence 
that municipal and provincial administrators over the 
project, and their interest in competing projects. The 
impact of the investment incentives allocated to SIPAC 
was diluted by their replication amongst other 
development zones. Moreover, a concession granted to 
SIPAC enabling it to retain all development revenue 
during its first ten years has caused local administrators 
to favour projects providing revenue to the municipality. 
This competition was heightened by the Suzhou New 
District (SND) which commenced earlier, and continued 
to be favoured. There has also been difficulty in retaining 
the software advantages within CS-SIP. Administrative 
distinctiveness has been weakened by the diffusion of 
practices to other industrial zones.  
 
The extent of Singapore’s disappointment is indicated by 
Senior Minister Lee’s public questioning of the 
commitment of the Chinese partners to the project. 
Singapore’s frustration has been greatest over the limited 
progress of commercial projects. Singaporean investors 
reportedly lost US$77 million over seven years of 
operations in retail and other services that were 
encouraged to set up in the township in expectations of 
the project’s rapid development. Significantly, there is 
also a political cost in the suggestion that Singapore was 
naive in perceiving that it would obtain a special status in 
China. 
  
In June 1999, it was announced that Singapore would 
reduce its involvement in the project and transfer 
majority ownership of CSSD to the Chinese consortium 
from 2001. CS-SIP had, by then, attracted investments 
which have provided a basis from which the township 
should grow. In January 2001, the Singapore consortium 
reduced its stake in CS-SIP to 35%. 
Interestingly, investments began to pour in thereafter, 
with profits of US$7.5 million expected in 2001, the first 
time since the Park’s inception [36]. Growth continues 
into 2002, with contracted investments reaching US 
$13.2 billion. The Park has since become a foreign 
investment hub linked to Fortune 500 companies. Over 
70 percent of investments in CS-SIP originate from 
OECD countries (Source: China-Singapore Suzhou 
Industrial Park Development Co. Ltd). 
 
Wuxi Singapore Industrial Park (WSIP) 
 
WSIP was instigated as a real estate development with 
the potential to cover up to 10 km2. The Park was 
designated a national high technology development zone 
as part of the Torch Program initiated in 1988.  
 
WSIP started as 70 percent Singapore-owned joint 
venture with the remaining 30 percent taken up by 
Wuxi’s municipal government. WSIP is designed 
exclusively for wholly foreign-owned ventures. In 
contrast to CS-SIP, WSIP was negotiated directly with 
the Wuxi authorities, and this direct involvement has 
minimized the polarization between the higher echelons 
of Chinese government and the provincial government.  
 
Development of WSIP commenced in 1994. The 
assistance from EDB in bringing the first tenants to the 
Park is acknowledged. As at June 2002, there were 55 
operating tenants and 15,000 workers in the Park. The 
total investment attracted (at US$1 billion) is well below 
that attracted to CS-SIP. WSIP’s focus on high-tech 
companies, notwithstanding, the investment profile is 
relatively low value-added, with more than 50 percent of 
investments drawn from Asian companies (Source: 
SembCorp Industries). 
  
Investor interest has slowed. Immediate prospects for 
growth are focused on the possible expansion of the 
initial investors.  WSIP has been developed to its second 
phase at a cost of US$872 million. However, WSIP has 
yet to attain economic viability. The Park has been 
operating at a loss since. In mid-2002, the SCI-led 
consortium signed an agreement to pare its stake in the 
loss-making WSIP. The transfer of shareholding and 
management control would, according SCI officials, 
result in better alignment of interests and improve the 
operating efficiency of the park. SCI will reduce its stake 
to 49 percent from 2003. SCI also expressed its ultimate 
interest in divesting its entire interest in WSIP, which it 
considers to be its `non-core business’. 
Not unlike CS-SIP, the Chinese partners have recently 
announced plans to develop the third phase of the 
project. The Park’s performance is expected to turn 
around in 2002. Thus, while WSIP has not experienced 
administrative difficulties with the local bureaucracy, the 
handing over to Chinese management mirrors the 
outcome of CS-SIP. 
 
VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
 
The Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) is 
Singapore’s flagship investment project in Vietnam.  The 
plan was first mooted in March 1994 by the then 
Vietnamese Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, and 
Singapore’s Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong. The 
lessons learned from the Chinese parks were put to play 
in VSIP. To prevent the difficulties encountered in the 
Suzhou `experiment’, greater care has been taken to 
foster stronger collaboration with local authorities. A 
consortium led by Singapore’s SembCorp Industries, and 
Becamex, a state-owned enterprise of the Binh Duong 
Province People's Committee (BDPPC), was formed to 
spearhead the project. Additionally, a Management 
Board was set up, chaired by BDPPC’s Vice-Chairman 
to ensure greater participation by the local authorities, 
and to pre-empt VSIP from being perceived as a 
partnership forced upon by the central government  
 
The 1000-hectare Park, 17 km north of Ho Chi Minh 
city, is modelled after BIP. Prior to its launch in May 
1995, a total of 13 international companies with 
investments worth US$80 million reportedly indicated 
their interest in VSIP [1]. The role of Singapore’s EDB is 
acknowledged. Of the current 53 operating tenants, 43 
are from Asia (Source: SembCorp Industries). The tenant 
mix reflects the overwhelming importance of Asian 
companies.  
  
Despite initial optimism over VSIP, profits have yet to 
be realised. This is largely due to competition from 
several other industrial parks, some of which are located 
next to VSIP. These industrial parks may not match the 
infrastructure and facilities provided by VSIP, but they 
compete on price. Tight market conditions have forced 
some VSIP tenants to seek cheaper alternatives. 
Industrial-park developers from Taiwan and Korea, 
experienced and street-savvy, have given VSIP cause for 
concern. 
 
The ‘special’ support from the local authorities also 
proved to be less significant than initially thought. 
Improvements on infrastructural projects have translated 
into higher miscellaneous fees, all of which raises the 
tenants’ operating costs. Some tension, albeit inexplicit, 
over Singapore’s `control’ and management of VSIP 
have also surfaced, suggesting that VSIP may face 
similar problems as CS-SIP. The fact that this problem 
did not escalate level could be attributed to Singapore’s 




In Asia’s rapidly growing economies, infrastructure can 
be unreliable and administration subject to corruption 
[10]. Foreign investment is invariably drawn to 
investment enclaves that provide privileged access to 
international trade, principally export processing zones 
[6], as well as in and around centres of international 
infrastructure. Singapore’s overseas parks are configured 
to exploit emerging production networks. This context 
provides opportunity for Singapore-developed parks 
through the provision of superior infrastructure and the 
ability to negotiate investment concessions. Influence 
can be exerted through inter-governmental interaction 
and, where existing, through the links to influential 
Chinese business groups in the investment location who 
often rely on state patronage for their access to 
infrastructure development projects.  
 
The progress of Singapore’s overseas parks over a 
comparatively short period of time indicates the ability 
of the city-state to mobilise economic and political 
resources. Nonetheless, as most openly admitted, 
substantial challenges remain to securing the long-term 
financial viability of the remaining flagship projects, and 
in achieving the larger goals set for the regionalization 
program.  
 
In the case of Indonesia, the raison d’etre for these 
projects seems to have over estimated the attractiveness 
of low cost production environments for MNCs [32]. As 
noted, BIP has increasingly become a Japanese 
investment enclave while Bintan has struggled to gain 
investment momentum. The Vietnamese experience is 
akin to that of BIP’s, where the economics of 
competition have called into question the premium 
attached to Singapore’s industrial-investment enclaves. 
 
In the case of China, the projects were expected to 
benefit from the ability of Singapore’s Chinese elites to 
obtain a special status through their ethnic allegiance and 
dual connections to overseas Chinese and western 
business networks. The Suzhou-Wuxi experience 
suggests that, while there is an interest in learning from 
Singapore, local officials wish to deal directly with 
foreign investors. This outcome accords with the 
assessment of observers that China tends increasingly not 
to view overseas Chinese as preferred investors [9]. 
 
For the projects in Indonesia and China, but less obvious 
in Vietnam, the reliance on personal ties rather than 
transparent contracts has had advantages and 
disadvantages. In the Indonesian projects, the reliance on 
the Salim Group had been necessary in the context of the 
Indonesian system of ‘crony capitalism’ [11]. The end of 
the Suharto era, and pressure from the IMF and western 
governments for financial transparency, has diminished 
Salim’s political or commercial influence. A longer-term 
uncertainty remains associated with the perceived 
weaknesses in the political leadership, and the continued 
resentment of Chinese-owned businesses amongst 
segments of Indonesian pribumi community [7]. In the 
China experiment, the limits of relying on personal ties 
have been most immediately encountered, where inter-
government endorsement at the top has proved 
insufficient to secure commitment at the lower tiers.  
The practical significance here is that Singapore’s 
overseas parks tend to exist as investment enclaves 
linked to multinational investment networks, business 
elites and specific government commitments. The 
positive aspect is that the parks can be sites of 
investment privilege, in respect of their status with public 
and private agencies. The weakness is that the privileges 
obtained are vulnerable to changes in political allegiance 
and the infrastructure efficiency is at risk from the 
uncontrolled broader environment in which the park is 
located. The mixed results of the `Singapore clones’ in 
Indonesia, China and Vietnam exemplify this.  
 
On regionalization per se, a judgement of failure or 
success may not be appropriate, given their mixed 
economic and political objectives. Official commitment 
to the projects remains, as is the acceptance of an 
extended time horizon to meet development targets. All 
the same, this study has shown that the initial optimism 
with which the R2000 projects were unveiled has not 
been justified, that development assumptions were mis-
aligned, and that cloning the Singapore `industrial-
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